The following is a chilling insight to the current Haitian crises...
OVERVIEW OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE
WESTERN HEMISPHERE
THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 27, 2003
(ed: No, not 2004, this is from last year Feb, 2003)
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES;
SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE
WESTERN
HEMISPHERE:
COMMITTEE ON
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
Haiti
The presidential determination listed nine specific counterdrug actions that Haiti
failed to take after being asked to do so by the United States, among them introduc-
tion of anti-corruption legislation, prosecution of drug-related public corruption, and
enforcement of the Haitian Central Bank’s existing anti-money laundering guide-
lines. It called Haiti ‘‘a significant transshipment point for drugs, primarily cocaine,
moving through the Caribbean from South America to the United States.’’ Haiti con-
tinued to have massive politicization of the national police force, failed to commit
additional resources to their coast guard, and did not increase the numbers of sei-
zures and arrests over those of prior years. In the case of Haiti, a vital national
interest waiver was provided to enable assistance to continue in order to alleviate
hunger, increase access to education, combat environmental degradation, fight the
spread of HIV/AIDS, and foster the development of civil society in Haiti.
Market Disruption
Another key objective of the President’s National Drug Control Strategy is to re-
duce the supply of illegal drugs in the United States, making drugs less available
and more expensive. We know that when drugs are less available, fewer young peo-
ple will begin using them. We thus approach supply reduction as a problem in dis-
rupting and destroying the drug market.
That market is profitable, to be sure (though less profitable than often assumed),
but it faces numerous and often overlooked obstacles that may be used as pressure
points. To view the drug trade as a market is to recognize both the challenges in-
volved and the hopeful lessons of our recent experience: that the drug trade is not
an unstoppable force of nature but a profit-making enterprise where costs and re-
wards exist in an equilibrium that can be disrupted. Every action that makes the
drug trade more costly and less profitable is a step toward ‘‘breaking’’ that market.
Once the drug trade is seen as a type—admittedly, a special type—of business en-
terprise, the next step is to examine the way the business operates and locate
vulnerabilities in specific market sectors and activities that can then be attacked,
both abroad and here at home. Such sectors and activities include the drug trade’s
agricultural sources, management structure, processing and transportation systems,
financing, and organizational decisionmaking. Each represents an activity that must
be performed for the market to function.
In his report, the President identified the following as major drug-transit or major
illicit drug-producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma,
China, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Jamaica,
Laos, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Thailand, Venezuela,
and Vietnam. The President also reported to Congress his determinations that
Burma, Guatemala, and Haiti failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months,
to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and
to take the measures set forth in U.S. law. The President determined, however, that
provision of United States assistance to Guatemala and Haiti in FY 2003 is vital
to the national interests of the United States. Therefore, under provisions of the
FRAA, these two countries will receive assistance, notwithstanding their counter-
narcotics performance. The President did not make this determination with respect
to Burma...
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